A new non-proprietary secret-key block-enciphering algorithm, SAFER K-64 (for Secure And Fast Encryption Routine with a Key of length 64 bits) is described.
Introduction

This paper describes a new block encryption algorithm called SAFER K-64
(for Secure And Fast Encryption Routine with a Key of length 64 bits) that the author recently developed for Cylink Corporation (Sunnyvale, CA, USA) as a non-proprietary cipher. SAFER K-64 is a byte-oriented block enciphering algorithm. The block length is 8 bytes (64 bits) for plaintext and ciphertext; the user-selected key is also 8 bytes (64 bits) in length. SAFER K-64 is an interated cipher in the sense that encryption is performed by applying the same transformation repeatedly for r rounds, then applying an output transformation; r = 6 is recommended but larger values of r can be used if desired for even greater security. Each round uses two 8-byte (64-bit ) subkeys determined by a key schedule from the secret 8-byte user-selected key. The output transformation uses another 8-byte subkey determined by the key schedule. One unusual feature of SAFER K-64 is that, in contrast to most recently proposed iterated block ciphers, encryption and decryption are slightly different (i.e., they differ by more than just the reversal of the key schedule). SAFER K-64 uses only byte operations in the processes of encryption and decryption, which makes it particularly useful in applications such as smart cards where very limited processing power is available. Some bit-level rotations of bytes are used in the key schedule, but this is done "once and for all", i.e., until the user-selected key is changed. To achieve security with such simple processing, SAFER K-64 exploits two new cryptographic concepts, namely:
(1) an unorthodox linear transform, which we call the Pseudo-Hadamard Transform (PHT) , that allows the cipher rapidly to achieve the desired "diffusion" of small changes in the plaintext or the key over the resulting ciphertext [It is usually the case in block cipher design that one struggles to obtain such diffusion by carefully selecting permutations to imbed within the cipher and then doing massive statistical testing to see which ones give acceptable diffusion. As will be seen, the PHT provides a systematic way to ensure that the cipher provides the necessary diffisuion--in fact, the diffusion provided by the PHT appears to be better than that in any other cipher that we
and (2) the use of additive key biases that eliminate the "weak keys" that plague most block ciphers. [SAFER K-64 includes a recursive procedure for generating these key biases that is easy to implement and that provides the very "random" biases desired.]
Description of the SAFER K-64 Algorithm
The encrypting structure of the SAFER K-64 cipher is shown in Fig. 1 . The enciphering algorithm consists of r rounds of identical transformations that are applied in sequence to the plaintext, followed by an output transformation, to produce the final ciphertext. Our recommendation is to use r = 6 for most applications, but up to 10 rounds can be used if desired. Each round is controlled by two 8-byte subkeys and the output transformation is controlled by one 8-byte subkey. These 2r + 1 subkeys are all derived from the 8-byte user-selected subkey K1 in a manner that will be explained later. The output transformation of SAFER K-64 consists of the bit-by-bit XOR ("exclusive or" or modulo-2 sum) of bytes 1, 4, 5 and 8 of the last subkey, K2r+1, with the corresponding bytes of the output from the r-th round together with the byte-by-byte byte addition (modulo-256 addition) of bytes 2, 3, 6 and 7 of the last subkey, K2r+1, to the corresponding bytes of the output from the r-th round. [Higher order bytes are considered to be those on the left, i.e., byte 1 is the most significant byte--this convention is used throughout this paper.] Hereafter, we refer to this particular combination of two eight-byte words as the Mixed XOR/Byte-Addition operation.
The detailed encryption round structure of SAFER K-64 is shown in Fig. 2 . The first step within the i th round is the Mixed XOR/Byte-Addition of the round input with the subkey K2i-1. The eight bytes of the result are then passed through a nonlinear layer and individually subjected to one of two different "highly nonlinear" transformations, namely:
(1) the operation labelled "45 (.) " in Fig. 2 Thus the mapping "45 (.) " is an invertible mapping from one byte to one byte that is very nonlinear with respect to the arithmetic of GF(257) as well as with respect to the vector space of 8-tuples over the binary field GF(2) whose addition is bit-by-bit XOR.] and (2) the operation labelled "log 45 " in Fig. 2 , which notation is to suggest that if the byte is the integer j then the byte output is log 45 (j) (except that this output is taken to be 128 if the input is j = 0), i.e., the power to which one must raise 45 to obtain j modulo 257.
[The nonlinear features of this mapping are similar to those described for 
Decryption for SAFER K-64
The decrypting structure of SAFER K-64 is shown in Fig. 3 This IPHT is just as simple to compute as the direct PHT. The fan-out-by-two permutation between levels of this inverse linear layer is the inverse of the decimate-bytwo permutation used in the linear layer of an encryption round. together with the bit-by-bit XOR (modulo-2 sum) of bytes 2, 3, 6 and 7 of the subkey K2r+2-2i with the corresponding bytes of the output from the previous round.
In the next step of the decryption round, the eight bytes from the previous step are passed through the "inverse nonlinear layer", which differs from the "nonlinear layer" in the encryption round by interchanging of the locations of the four exponentiating boxes and the four logarithm-taking boxes.
The last step within the i th decryption round is the Mixed XOR/Byte-Subtraction of the round input with the subkey K2r+1-2i, which consists of the bit-by-bit XOR (modulo-2 sum) of bytes 1, 4, 5 and 8 of the subkey K2r+1-2i with the corresponding bytes of the output from the previous round together with the byte-by-byte byte subtraction (modulo-256 subtraction) of bytes 2, 3, 6 and 7 of the subkey K2r+1-2i from the corresponding bytes of the output from the previous round.
How SAFER K-64 Works and Why
To see that the SAFER K-64 cipher correctly decrypts, we first note that the Mixed XOR/Byte-Subtraction of K2r+1 in the Input Transformation for decryption (cf. Fig. 3 ) undoes the Mixed XOR/Byte-Additon of K2r+1 in the Output Transformation for encryption (cf. Fig. 1 ). Then the inverse linear layer of the first decryption round (cf. Fig. 4 ) undoes the transformation performed by the linear layer in the last encryption round (cf. Fig. 2) . Next, the Mixed Byte-Subtraction/XOR of K2r in the first decryption round (cf. Fig. 4 ) undoes the Mixed Byte-Addition/XOR of K2r in the last encryption round (cf Fig. 2 ). Then the inverse nonlinear layer in the first decryption round (cf. Fig.   4 ) undoes the transformation performed by the nonlinear layer in the last encryption round (cf. Fig. 2) . Finally, the Mixed XOR/Byte-Subtraction of K2r-1 in the first decryption round (cf. Fig. 4 ) undoes the Mixed XOR/Byte-Addition of K2r-1 in the last encryption round (cf. Fig. 2 ). In the same way, decryption round i undoes the transformation performed by encryption round r + 1 -i for i = 2, 3, ... , r so that decryption indeed recovers the original plaintext. Notice that the determinant of the matrix of coefficients is -2, which makes these equations non-invertible for byte arithmetic (arithmetic modulo 256) where -2 = 254 has no multiplicative inverse. It also has the unpleasant effect of requiring a multiplication by 1/2 in the inverse transform in those number systems where 2 has a multiplicative inverse. By choosing equations (1), whose matrix of coefficients has determinant 1, we avoid both of these problems--we can use normal byte arithmetic and there is no unpleasant scale factor in the inverse transform! Moreover, we can still mimic the HT in the multi-dimensional case, which is what the decimations by-two and fanning-outs bytwo accomplish. We are in fact using a three-dimensional PHT, i.e., independent 2-PHTs in each of 3 dimensions, which is why there are 2 3 = 8 bytes in the input and output of the PHT within SAFER K-64.
Just as for the HT in number systems appropriate to it, every digit (here read "byte") of the input to the PHT effects every output byte, i.e., the PHT provides guaranteed complete diffusion within one linear layer. In Appendix A, we show the PHT for the unit-vector inputs where one sees this diffusion over all eight output bytes very clearly. By linearity, the PHT of any vector can be computed as the corresponding linear combination of these unit-vector PHT's. The "guaranteed complete diffusion" within one layer does not hold fully when one considers single-bit changes in the input bytes.
Because of the factor of 2 in equations (1), a few bits of the input will effect only 4 bytes (or 2 bytes or 1 byte) of the output within one linear layer, but their effect is immediately spread over all 8 bytes in the next linear layer encountered. This can be seen from the last three examples in Appendix A. For instance, because (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) has the PHT (8, 4, 4, 2, 4, 2, 2, 1) , it follows [from the fact that 2 * 128 = 0 mod 256] that (128, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) , which contains a single non-zero bit, will have the PHT (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 128) , which shows no diffusion at all. However, in turn (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 128) has the PHT (128, 128, 128, 128, 128, 128, 128, 128) , which shows complete diffusion over output bytes. In fact, consideration of the unit-vector PHT's in Appendix A shows that (128, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) is the only vector that shows no diffusion under one application of the PHT. We know of no other cipher with such rapid and guaranteed diffusion. This rapid diffusion is the main reason that r = 6 rounds of encipherment are enough to make SAFER K-64 crack-resistant.
The Key Schedule for SAFER K-64
The key schedule for SAFER K-64, i.e., the procedure for generating the subkeys K2, K3, ... , K2r+1 from the user-selected subkey K1, is indicated in Fig. 5 . 
which equation defines the key biases used in SAFER K-64. We note here that we might have used the factor 8 instead of 9 in the exponent in (4)--we chose 9 to introduce an extra measure of "staccato" in the key schedule." A Table giving the precise values of the key biases for SAFER K-64 is given in Appendix B. Examination of the Table in Appendix B shows that the resulting sequence of biases is indeed very random appearing, which is all that is really needed. The use of such biases, which appears to be new, is clearly a good idea in general for iterated ciphers. The "weak keys" (also called "self-dual keys" and "keys with a dual") of the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [2] are a direct result of the fact that no key biases are used so that, for instance, all 16 round subkeys in DES can be all-zero.] 
SAFER K-64 Program and Examples
Appendix C gives a TURBO PASCAL program that implements the full rround SAFER K-64 cipher, both for encryption and decryption.. This program should be taken as the definition of the SAFER K-64 enciphering algorithm. Appendix C also gives examples of r = 6 round encryption (the recommended number of rounds) for use in checking implementations of SAFER K-64.
Security Considerations for SAFER K-64
In Section 4, we indicated how SAFER K-64 achieves both good diffusion and good confusion, the two basic features that contribute to the security of a block cipher.
The best measure of security available today for an iterated block cipher is its resistance to attack by differential cryptanalysis [3] . It is easy to show that, for the appropriate definition of difference between a pair of plaintext blocks (or a pair of ciphertext blocks), SAFER K-64 is a Markov cipher [4] , a fact that greatly simplifies its analysis for resistance to differential cryptanalysis. Cylink Corporation has contracted for such an analysis of SAFER K-64 by a group of cryptanalysts that does not include the designer of the algorithm. A considerable effort has been invested in this effort, whose conclusion is that six-round SAFER K-64 appears to be secure against differential cryptanalysis.
This group of cryptanalysts has also done extensive statistical testing of SAFER K-64
with no detection of any weakness. The evidence available today suggests that SAFER K-64 is a strong cipher whose strength is well measured by the length (64 bits) of its user-selected key. VAR a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7, b8 flag:= 0; writeln; writeln('Enter number of rounds r (max 10) desired then hit CR'); readln(r); REPEAT BEGIN writeln; writeln('Enter plaintext in 8 bytes with spaces'); writeln(' between bytes, then hit CR.'); writeln('(A byte is an integer between 0 and 255 inclusive.)'); readln(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8); writeln('Enter a key in 8 bytes'); readln(k [1, 1] ,k [1, 2] ,k [1, 3] ,k [1, 4] ,k [1, 5] ,k [1, 6] ,k [1, 7] ,k [1, 8] ', a1:8,a2:4,a3:4,a4:4,a5:4,a6:4,a7:4,a8:4) ; writeln('The KEY is ', k [1, 1] :8,k [1, 2] :4,k [1, 3] :4,k [1, 4] :4, k [1, 5] :4,k [1, 6] :4,k [1, 7] :4,k [1, 8] {The r rounds of encryption begin here.} FOR i:= 1 TO r DO BEGIN {Key 2i-1 is mixed bit and byte added to the round input.}
